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How the City Grows
Urban Growth and Challenges to 
Sustainable Development in Doha, Qatar
Andrew M. Gardner
In the short historical trajectory of sustainable development, attention to 
the idea of urban sustainability has been a particularly late addition. Cit-
ies, as industrial nodes and as spaces of dense human habitation, have 
long been portrayed as antithetical to sustainability. This longstanding ru-
ral bias has a sensible legacy, for among their many qualities, cities are lo-
cations where the detritus of our human existence congeals and, perhaps 
more to the point, where the scale of that detritus becomes most visible. 
And although sustainable development is a relatively new paradigmatic 
force, the notion that cities are somehow inappropriate or problematic 
venues for human habitation has a much longer and storied history in 
both European and Middle Eastern traditions. In the latter tradition, Ibn 
Khaldun portrayed the city as a culturally refi ned but morally corrup-
tive space.1 Centuries later, these same conceptions of the city percolated 
through European and American thought, and eventually came to serve as 
the backdrop to substantial portions of classic Western social theory, per-
haps most clearly distilled in the Jeffersonian fetishization of the agricul-
tural livelihood (and a corresponding mistrust of the city and its denizens). 
These conceptions of the city persevere, and today it is more common than 
ever to fi nd the romanticized portrait of pre-civilized and decidedly non-
urban human functioning as a conceptual antidote to the excesses of our 
contemporary, capitalist and highly urban world. In North America, these 
perceptions cling to the Native Americans and First Nations of that conti-
nent; in Arabia, the same notions adhere to the Bedouin pastoral nomads 
who traditionally populated the interior of the Peninsula.
The new focus on urban sustainability rejects this history. Certainly 
the notion that pre-capitalist and non-urban humans lived lives ‘in bal-
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ance’ with nature has been challenged by a constellation of scholars who 
together purvey a more supportable contention that in the history of hu-
mankind, some people seem to have found some sort of balance with their 
natural environment in some places for some period of time (e.g. Lansing 
1991; Diamond 2005; Smith and Wishnie 2000; Hames 2007). Presently, 
however, other factors are also driving the increased attention to urban 
sustainability. First, there is the stark reality of the previous decade – one 
in which we passed from a primarily rural species to a primarily urban 
one. More than half of the human population now dwells in cities, and we 
face a future that looks ever more urban. The task of collectively creating a 
more sustainable future must necessarily contend with the primary loca-
tion of our species’ habitation. Second, a coterie of scholars have pointed 
to the inherent effi ciencies of urban life (Owen 2009; Light 2001, 2003; 
see also Keil 2005). In cities, human habitation is dense. People live in 
close quarters, often stacked upon one another in apartment buildings 
and other densely effi cient dwellings. They live close to commercial cen-
tres and to the services they require, and can often access those centres 
and services by mass transit or on foot. Urban populations in developed 
nations generally require less per capita infrastructure, and specifi cally 
less of the expensive infrastructure that must (ideally) bring water, elec-
tricity, gas and asphalt to the domicile, as well as the infrastructure that 
must (again, ideally) carry away waste. As these scholars argue, proximity 
and density make the city inherently effi cient, and their calculations sug-
gest that the urbanite’s ecological footprint is typically smaller by several 
degrees of magnitude than her suburban or rural counterpart. In other 
words, within the domain of developed countries, persuasive arguments 
have been made that cities are, by design, inherently more sustainable than 
many other forms of human habitation.
Sustainable Development and the City
Another facet of urban sustainability, and one perhaps less clearly articu-
lated in the literature, is that cities are increasingly prominent actors in the 
vanguard of the sustainability movement. When it comes to developing, 
declaring, and deploying sustainable goals, cities themselves serve as im-
portant units of collective action. Perth, Australia; Portland, Oregon; Van-
couver, British Columbia, and countless other cities today function as key 
stakeholders in the collective enacting of sustainable goals (Newman and 
Jennings 2008). One can envision a variety of different reasons at work 
here. Even the largest cities are able to develop cohesive identities capable 
of articulating sustainability initiatives. Cities also provide an integrated 
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political unit in which citizen groups – that is, neighbourhood groups and 
other voluntary organizations that operate on a local level – can feasibly 
assert their interests, in contrast to federal systems in which the voices of 
these groups are lost in the scale and scope of national-level politics. Cities 
are a principal apex for those energies that gather strength at the grass-
roots level, and they comprise a much more manageable target for change 
than national or global systems. Perhaps cities also replicate the context 
described by Raymond Firth in his ethnographic work with the Tikopians. 
By his analysis, the small island presented a cohesive and limited resource 
domain to the island’s denizens. Every adult was aware of the limitations 
presented by his or her environment, and with no accessible frontier past 
which more resources might be discovered or, perhaps more to the point, 
past which more resources might be imagined, the Tikopians eventually 
established a notably sustainable pattern of human/environmental inter-
action. Contemporary cities, of course, are quite different from isolated 
Pacifi c islands; indeed, cities are central nodes in the global production, 
circulation and consumption of commodities and the resources those 
commodities draw upon. But cities do provide their inhabitants with a 
bounded unit with which to think – a demarcated social and geographi-
cal space to which collective and potentially sustainable aspirations can 
be affi xed. Cities’ successes in articulating and implementing sustainable 
goals have further distanced urban space from its traditional position as 
the antithesis of sustainability movements.
The increasing prominence of the city in the sustainable development 
discourse, however, does not correlate with the distillation or progres-
sive coherence in that concept’s meaning. To the contrary, the concept 
of sustainable development is broadly used in the contemporary world, 
and over the course of its expanding currency it has come to mean many 
different things to many different people. A review of sustainable devel-
opment’s many meanings and the tectonic frictions underlying its ongo-
ing fl orescence is beyond the scope of this chapter, and has been well 
described by others (e.g. Adams 2001; Baker 2006).2 This chapter, however, 
asserts a classic and critical defi nition of sustainable development that, 
in the contemporary era, might also be posited as a radical perspective: 
sustainability and sustainable development are far-reaching concepts that 
require fundamental changes in our relationship to the environment, in 
the structure of our social relations, and in the ideas and values we hold 
dear. I suggest this defi nition of sustainable development as radical be-
cause of the scope of change it requires. Like other scholars, I see many 
of the capitalist imperatives of the contemporary world forging societies 
that aspire to constant and competitive growth, a feature that is by defi -
nition antithetical to sustainability (e.g. Broswimmer 2002). At the same 
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time, I contend that this take on sustainable development is also a classic 
one, in the sense that our ability to ensure future generations can meet 
their needs – a feature fundamental to many enduring defi nitions of the 
concept – remains a fi ne metric by which we can measure our progress (if 
any) towards this goal (see Baker 2006 for a similar argument). This also 
suggests that the appropriate goal for our collective aspirations should 
be sustainability, rather than sustainable development, particularly for 
those wealthy countries and populations that already fi t the description 
of ‘developed’.
This brief sketch of a radical (yet classical!) take on sustainable devel-
opment merits more attention and analytic support, but as noted, those 
arguments have been made elsewhere at great length (e.g. Adams 2001; 
Baker 2006). With the above defi nition of sustainability and its relation to 
the urban form in place, this chapter considers the potential challenges of 
implementing a meaningful and substantive version of sustainability in 
the wealthy and highly urban state of Qatar and, by proxy, the neighbour-
ing GCC states. Qatar has explicitly expressed a commitment to sustain-
able development, and has integrated sustainability-oriented frameworks 
into both its national vision and the urban master plan for Doha, the sin-
gle urban agglomeration on the small peninsula.3 While this public and 
state-driven adoption of sustainable development can be read as a sign 
of sustainable development’s growing signifi cance, many would agree 
that Doha and the other astonishing cities of the Arabian Peninsula would 
probably look no different today if the goal of sustainable development 
had been rejected or altogether ignored rather than adopted.4
The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to consider the potential chal-
lenges of implementing a meaningful, substantive and radically transfor-
mative version of sustainability in Doha and, by association, in the other 
wealthy and highly urban states of the Arabian Peninsula. After a brief 
overview of city and society in Qatar, I will frame the remainder of the 
article around three dilemmas I see as central obstacles to the successful 
deployment of a meaningful sustainability in this city.
Khaleeji Society and the Cities of the Arabian Peninsula
With some justifi cation, the six Gulf states of the Arabian Peninsula are 
often treated as a single socio-political and cultural unit. This affi liation 
is perhaps best represented by the term al khaleej, an Arabic term used 
to refer to the six Gulf states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Oman) in their entirety, with connotations of 
the social and cultural homogeneity resulting from the strong commonali-
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ties in the history of these states’ development. The roots of this affi liation 
stretch deep into history. In environmental terms, all of the Arabian Penin-
sula is an arid desert with extraordinarily sparse resources. Two principal 
and symbiotically intertwined livelihoods historically predominated in 
the region. A town-based society comprised of settled and largely urban 
peoples (in Arabic, hadhari) was built upon the foundation of trade. This 
trade included both maritime commerce and caravan-based trade to the 
peninsula’s interior. In some parts of Arabia, limited agricultural pro-
duction also occurred (particularly in Oman, parts of Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain). Along the coastal regions of the Persian Gulf, these town-based 
peoples also took to the sea, and prospered from pearl production, fi sh-
ing, piracy and trade, thereby forging a signifi cant merchant class.5 The 
livelihoods of the urban peoples enmeshed in these activities were histori-
cally intertwined with the second predominant livelihood, practiced by 
Bedouin pastoral nomads (in Arabic, badawi) who made use of the vast 
spaces between these villages and towns. While the division between 
badawi and hadhari was wrought long ago, and while these categories have 
historically demonstrated more fl exibility than this superfi cial description 
would suggest, the bifurcation between settled peoples and nomadic pas-
toral peoples has been held in place for centuries by the genealogical logic 
of tribalism. This tribalism has been reaffi rmed through the political orga-
nization of the contemporary Gulf state (and particularly so in Qatar).
To some degree, all six of the Gulf states historically shared a position 
on the margins of the British Empire. British relations with the region were 
administered via British India, although Arabia played an insubstantial 
role in the Empire for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Perhaps the most important commonality in these six states’ histories is 
the discovery of oil. All six of the Gulf states possess (or once possessed) 
signifi cant petroleum resources; states and economies were constructed 
around the wealth generated by this resource. Today, Qatar and its neigh-
bours are often described as rentier states. In practice, signifi cant portions 
of oil profi ts are diverted to a vast social welfare apparatus. Paramount 
to these transfers and to the organization of these states is the public sec-
tor: immense portions of the contemporary GCC economies are operated 
through the public or quasi-public sector. Citizens in Qatar and the other 
Gulf states today expect public sector jobs, and the state is constructed 
around the twin role of disbursing state-held wealth (its traditional twen-
tieth-century role) and guiding the states’ diversifi cation plans away from 
petroleum dependency. While citizens of Qatar and the other Gulf States 
enjoy limited political participation via municipal elections and consul-
tative bodies, all the Gulf states are controlled by hereditary extended 
families (or tribes) – the Al Thani clan in Qatar, the Al Khalifa clan in Bah-
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rain and so forth. In analytic terms, the welfare state and limited political 
participation common to all the Gulf states have been conceptually linked: 
scholars suggest that citizens have begrudgingly yielded their political 
rights in exchange for the astonishing benefi ts of welfare systems that 
convey wealth from state to citizen (Luciani 1987; Beblawi 1987; Kamrava 
2009; see also Dresch 2006: 201). In public discourse, the leading families 
of Qatar and the other Gulf states conceptualize their role as cosmopolitan 
stewards of states whose principal task is to guide the more traditional 
and conservative components of the respective citizenries to modernity.
Qatar and the neighbouring Gulf states are, per capita, among the 
wealthiest states in the world. Citizens typically receive (and expect) sub-
sidized or free utilities, land, education, medical care, no-interest loans 
and, often, public sector jobs. Most Qataris, for example, dwell in ex-
tremely large freestanding ‘villas’, employ a small to large staff of do-
mestic servants, and drive new or relatively new cars. Oftentimes that 
car is a Toyota Landcruiser, a model that seems to function as a marker of 
citizenship in contemporary Qatar. It is not unusual to encounter families 
with six, eight or ten cars. While the wealth of Qatar and the other Gulf 
States can be perceived at the level of the individual citizen, much of the 
state-controlled wealth has been ploughed into development plans, and 
much of that development is urban in nature. Museums, heritage centres, 
sports arenas, skyscrapers, offshore islands, amusement parks, confer-
ence centres, national mosques, residential developments and many other 
components of urban development are directly or indirectly funded with 
the wealth generated by oil rents. Indeed, the pace of this urban develop-
ment long ago surpassed the domestic labour supply. Today in Qatar, well 
over 1 million of the 1.6 million inhabitants of the small country are for-
eign residents, and the largest portion of that foreign population is made 
up of construction workers (typically from South Asia). Despite some of 
the highest natural growth rates in the developed world, in Qatar and 
several of the other wealthy GCC states citizens comprise an increasingly 
small portion of the overall population: the scale of transnational labour 
migration, driven largely by urban development, continues to outpace 
natural growth.
Thus, urban development is a central feature of the contemporary Gulf. 
Indeed, as Sharon Nagy (2000: 128) has noted, ‘The public has come to 
accept, and expect, government action in the realm of development and 
maintenance of the built environment.’ In most of the Gulf states, rural 
populations have migrated to the city, producing one of the most urban-
ized collection of states in the world. In Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and 
the Emirates, the large primate cities are also defi ned by their function as 
political capitals. As I have argued elsewhere, the astonishing urban proj-
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ects that rise in the Gulf also serve a symbolic function: Gulf cities are the 
trophy cases of a people and its leadership, and are directly intended to 
convey a particular message about the arrival of modernity in the region 
to a global audience (Gardner 2008, 2009). Sustainable development has 
emerged as an important discursive element in this urban development. 
Although the mission of constructing a more sustainable urban future is 
often tied to plans for the respective states’ diversifi cation away from oil 
dependency, the Gulf states also recognize sustainable development as 
an emergent and symbolically important attribute of the cosmopolitan 
modernity purveyed by other wealthy, urban and developed nations in 
the world.
With that brief background in mind, I now turn to three fundamental 
and intertwined challenges to the implementation of a meaningful form of 
sustainable development in the region.
Sustainable Development as a Threat to 
Political Stability in the Gulf States
In the petroleum-rich state of Qatar, the unparalleled pace of urban devel-
opment has become more than a fact of life for the inhabitants of the city. 
Indeed, the pace itself has become emblematic of the city-state’s global 
identity; urban development has taken on a fetishistic quality that pits Qa-
tar against the neighbouring Gulf states in a competition for superlative 
standing. In this competition, Formula One racetracks, large human-made 
islands, stadiums capable of hosting global sports tournaments, extraordi-
nary skyscrapers, satellite campuses of American universities and a vari-
ety of other mega-features of the urban landscape function as the symbolic 
capital by which these states assert their position in the vanguard of a cos-
mopolitan rendition of modernity (see Nagy 2000 for an insightful analy-
sis). This conversation with the rest of the world has a second purpose, for 
in asserting their modernity through urban construction, the Gulf states 
simultaneously forge unifi ed nationalisms over the complex allegiances 
and heterogeneous traditions of their citizenries. Like the Statue of Liberty 
or the Eiffel Tower, the supermodern components of the Gulf city seek to 
symbolically construct a homogenous idea of nation, and thereby elide the 
differences characteristic of Gulf populations – the differences between 
hadhari and badawi, between Shi’a and Sunni or between citizens of Arab 
descent and those of Persian descent (see Nagy 2006; Longva 2006). As 
this line of reasoning suggests, these cities and their dramatic expansion 
can be best understood in symbolic terms.
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More practically, however, the supermodern components of these urban 
landscapes are also portrayed as the infrastructure for an economically di-
verse future. Tourism and the ongoing development of ‘knowledge-based 
economies’ to which many of these urban development projects are tied 
are central features of Qatar and its neighbouring states’ plans to wean 
their economies from petroleum dependency. Around the Gulf, similar 
diversifi cation plans are largely intended to recapture capital that, for the 
time being, fl ows away from the Gulf states. A representative example of 
this sort of urban development project is ‘The Pearl’, a massive residential 
and commercial development constructed on a human-made island off 
the coast of Qatar. As a freeholder zone in a state that allows only Qatari 
citizens to own property, the residential development seeks to capture rent 
and investment monies that, in the past, have been channelled by foreign 
residents working in Qatar to other locations around the globe. In this 
sense, the astonishing urban commercial/residential developments char-
acteristic of the region are, as a whole, portrayed as a form of sustainable 
development, in that they seek to shift economies from their obviously 
unsustainable dependence on petroleum resources to a potentially more 
sustainable and diversifi ed economic foundation for the post-petroleum 
era.6
Yet while urban development, and particularly the trophy architecture 
of contemporary Doha, Dubai and the neighbouring cities occupies the 
spotlight, the political economy that drives this urban development is 
decidedly offstage. Moreover, the product of urban development includes 
much more than those architectural constructions whose symbolic reso-
nance achieves global currency. Surrounding the tall buildings, museums 
and new universities is a sprawling sea of more mundane construction 
perhaps best typifi ed by the housing compound and the apartment build-
ing. In all the Gulf states, the skilled foreign class needed to build, staff 
and maintain these supermodern cities is most typically housed in one 
of these two residential forms, as opposed to the free-standing homes 
(or ‘villas’) preferred by many khaleeji citizens, and the labour camps that 
house many of the unskilled transnational migrant workers.7 Apartment 
buildings, I will assume, are familiar to readers. Compounds, while cer-
tainly not unique to the Gulf, are perhaps unique in their ubiquity in the 
region. Compounds in the Gulf states are characterized by the tall walls 
that surround them and a single entrance with a staffed security gate. 
Compounds may include villas (large single-family homes), apartments 
and often a combination of the two. Many compounds contain central 
recreation facilities, a small store and other services. Combined with the 
proliferating apartment buildings springing up in many of the Gulf cit-
ies, these compounds serve the burgeoning transnational middle class at 
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work in the region, and while they pale in the shadows of the symbolically 
laden super-constructions that garner global attention, understanding the 
political economy of their proliferation will lay bare the essence of my 
argument: a confl uence of forces at work in the Gulf states has produced a 
spatially hungry system that directly challenges initiatives for sustainable 
development.
As this contention suggests, I wish to add a third facet to our under-
standing of the astonishing urban development characteristic of the re-
gion. In addition to its purported economic function of capturing global 
fl ows of capital, and in addition to building the idea of nation over the 
heterogeneous social reality of the Gulf states, the process of urban de-
velopment has become a central conduit for the transfer of wealth from 
state to citizen, and hence key to the political legitimacy of the extended 
families that politically (and economically) control each of the Gulf states. 
A parallel argument has already been established in academic literature 
concerning the public sector in the Gulf states. In Qatar and all the Gulf 
states, public sector employment functions as a primary conduit for the 
transfer of state-controlled petroleum wealth to its citizen-constituents. In 
all of the Gulf states, foreign workers and entrepreneurs are the founda-
tion and majority of the private sector. Citizens, meanwhile, are almost 
entirely employed directly by the state in public sector jobs. In Qatar, 
over 95 per cent of the citizen-workforce is employed in the public sector: 
they work directly for the ministries comprising the state, for the public 
utilities that serve both migrants and citizens, in the police force and na-
tional guard and in many other capacities.8 A variety of reasons have been 
cited for the citizenry’s preference for work in the public sector. These 
reasons include high pay and benefi ts of these state-provided jobs; the of-
ten gender-segregated offi ces that fi t the cultural norms of the region (and 
thereby foster women’s entry into the job market); the predominance of 
Arabic in these workplaces (as opposed to English in much of the private 
sector); and the timings of work in the public sector (typically, 7:00 am 
to 1:00 pm). In my own previous work, I have focused on the underlying 
logic of the public sector, and argued that over the previous decades this 
sector of the labour market provided a differentiable system where quali-
ties uniquely possessed by citizens – familial and tribal networks, and 
wasta (an Arabic term that is roughly equivalent to social capital) – could 
be used to secure employment in the public sector, thereby insulating citi-
zens from the competitive meritocratic logic of a private sector in which 
many are poorly positioned to compete (Gardner 2010). Perhaps more to 
the point, however, social scientists have suggested that these public sec-
tor jobs function as the primary channel for the transfer of wealth from 
state to citizen, and thereby comprise the keystone in the legitimacy of 
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the Gulf states’ leadership (e.g. Willoughby 2008). Indeed, employment is 
conceived as an integral part of the constellation of entitlements citizens 
expect from the state.
In the context of a state dependent on extraordinarily large fl ows of 
foreign labour (in Qatar, for example, there are more than eight foreign-
ers for every citizen), real estate functions as a second vital conduit for 
the transfer of petroleum wealth from state to citizen (see Dresch 2006: 
202; also Gardner 2009). With the exception of a few special economic 
zones and freeholder developments scattered around the region, only citi-
zens can own property in the Gulf states.9 In Doha, property ownership 
functions as the foundation of a scenario typical throughout the Gulf: the 
Qatari state, in conjunction with a constellation of transnational energy 
corporations, directly controls the wealth resulting from the sale of the 
state’s petroleum reserves. In addition to controlling this wealth, the state 
assumes the responsibility of guiding the nation’s infrastructural, eco-
nomic and social development. In one of its various capacities – through 
ministries, universities, hospitals or quasi-statal industries, the state hires 
foreigners to come and design, construct, manage and operate the com-
ponents of its developing city. The vast majority of the professional class 
arriving on the peninsula work directly or indirectly for the public sector, 
and the ministries, institutions, and companies for which they work place 
them in housing compounds or buildings owned by other citizens. The 
citizens who own these compounds and buildings then accumulate the 
profi ts generated by the astronomical rents characteristic of the region – in 
Doha, for example, villas in compounds can easily rent for US $4,000 or 
more per month. The suburban horizon of Doha is now fi lled with these 
compounds, and with citizens now outnumbered almost ten to one by 
foreign residents, the scale of this transfer can hardly be overstated: rental 
properties, in the guise of a workforce dedicated to urban development, 
comprise one of the principal mechanisms for transferring wealth from 
the state to its citizenry.
Yet transfers through rental properties are only the frontline of this po-
litical economy of urban development. The construction of an imagined 
compound, for example, includes the efforts and energies of a constella-
tion of other businesses – the company that makes cement, the company 
that owns the trucks to move material and equipment to the site, the man-
power agency that brings construction workers from South Asia to the 
Gulf and the fi rm that designs the villas and apartments in the compound. 
And once the foreign workforce is placed in the compound, villas must be 
furnished, automobiles much be purchased and children’s tuition must 
be paid. Indeed, vast portions of the contemporary Gulf economies are 
oriented towards the project of urban growth, and countless citizens, as 
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the owner/sponsors of these various enterprises, depend directly on these 
transfers (and, more obliquely, upon the state’s ongoing promotion of 
urban development as a national priority).
What I suggest, then, is that urban development has become an integral 
component of the implicit contract between state and citizen in the Gulf 
states. In its current confi guration, this system is dependent upon an ever-
present and ever-increasing fl ow of foreigners to the Gulf states.10 Put an-
other way, the expanding contingent of foreigners employed to assist and 
guide the Gulf states’ development collectively function as the currency 
by which wealth is transferred from state to citizen. The highest rewards 
go to those citizens who, in terms of urban development, operate at the 
largest scale. The crux of the argument, then, reverses the apparent logic of 
this arrangement: it is not this urban development that forges new social 
relations in the Gulf, but rather the ongoing articulation of indigenous 
social relations that drives urban development.11 Expanding families, and 
particularly expanding powerful families, require urban development. 
Guiding that development is what young, well-placed citizens do, and it 
is the basis of their and their family’s economic power.
A meaningful and substantial commitment to sustainability must 
include some provisions for controlling urban sprawl and, eventually, 
shifting away from a growth-based economy. By briefl y examining the 
political economy of urban growth in the Gulf states, however, I suggest 
that the model of urban growth in Qatar presents a strikingly unsustain-
able socio-political and economic template for the near future. This model, 
while publicly conceptualized as merely the pathway towards a rapidly 
approaching endpoint (the depletion of petroleum resources and a di-
versifi ed socio-economic future to cope with that reality), and now pro-
moted in the discourse of sustainable development, has become deeply 
interlocked with the social and cultural fabric of the contemporary Gulf 
state. Citizens’ notions of entitlement, their expectations of the state and 
the high natural growth rate in the region only fuel the situation. Rein-
ing in urban growth will undermine one of the two principle conduits by 
which wealth is transferred from state to citizen, and political stability in 
the region is partially contingent upon the legitimacy produced by these 
transfers. Hence a more sustainable model of urban growth represents a 
signifi cant potential threat to political stability in the region.
Sustainable Development in a Top-Down Society
The role urban development plays in maintaining tribal and interfamilial 
relations in the respective Gulf states is a testament to the intricacies by 
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which modernity, development and the state itself have been integrated 
into the complex and often divisive social relations that previously pre-
dominated in the region. While urban development functions as a mecha-
nism for maintaining traditional forms of stratifi cation in these Arabian 
societies, the top-down character of political and social power in the re-
gion also poses signifi cant challenges to the implementation of meaning-
ful sustainability in the region. In this section, I consider how the precepts 
developed by several decades of thought concerning sustainability and 
sustainable development might founder in the contemporary Gulf.
Over four decades of its articulation, sustainable development has 
come to encompass a variety of grassroots approaches, community-based 
initiatives, activism and proposals for re-engineering contemporary forms 
of democracy. In development theory, these ‘bottom-up’ approaches 
emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the centralized, monolithic 
and universalizing approach to development. The new paradigm sought 
to put people fi rst, and to build participatory models for a successful and 
sustainable form of development (e.g. Chambers 1983, 1994; Cernea 1991). 
Bill Adams (2001) suggests that the incorporation of indigenous knowl-
edge and community-based approaches was central to contemporary sus-
tainable development, and more recent attention to the nexus between 
sustainable development and environmental justice clearly portrays the 
ongoing legacy of the American civil rights movement in sustainable de-
velopment (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans 2003: 7). For many post-Marxist 
environmental scholars, participatory models and grassroots approaches 
are more than just an effi cient means to a more sustainable end – they 
are the end goal in and of themselves. Franz Broswimmer’s call for an 
‘ecological democracy’, for example, is based on the contention that the 
protection of other species and their habitat will require that ‘ordinary 
citizens be able to take part at the grassroots level in decision-making 
that effects their environment’ (2002: 98). These participatory, community-
based and inherently democratic frameworks are particularly prominent 
in the ongoing conceptualization of urban-focused sustainable develop-
ment (Newman and Jennings 2008: 156).
Many popular books concerned with the implementation of sustain-
ability in developed nations conclude with a chapter concerning what a 
person can do in order to make a difference with these issues (e.g Brown 
2008; Orr 2009). The basic premise of these concluding chapters seems to 
be two-fold: fi rst, we can and should make signifi cant changes in our own 
lives and households; and second, we can and should vote and politically 
mobilize to help those ideas percolate into law and governing structures. 
What I suggest, then, is that a close reading of the sustainable development 
literature confi rms the centrality of a democratic foundation to the ongo-
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ing articulation of sustainable development’s goals, as well as the methods 
and practices by which those goals can be achieved. Furthermore, while a 
signifi cant portion of ‘mainstream’ sustainable development assumes this 
essentially democratic foundation, a signifi cantly larger portion of what 
I have described as radical/classical sustainable development does the 
same, particularly in those radical renditions of sustainable development 
that challenge state-based deployment of a sustainability friendly to the 
interests of a corporate-dominated economy. Similarly, much of urban 
sustainability theory and practice suggests that individuals must have 
more power and control over the environment they live in and depend 
upon. In much sustainability theory, this power and control is portrayed 
either explicitly or implicitly in democratic terms.
Considering the assuredly non-democratic political structure of Qatar 
and the other Gulf states, how transferable is the package of ideas and 
methods operating under the banner of sustainable development? Qatar 
and its neighbouring states lack many of the political and social compo-
nents that play a central role in the practice of sustainable development. 
Civil society in the region is generally perceived as absent, anemic or 
imported (Kamrava 2009; Reiche 2010). Claims of indigeneity are muted 
or absent: those Bedouin groups with claims of indigeneity are not par-
ticipants in the growing congress of global indigenous peoples. Citizens 
rarely form neighbourhood groups or action committees to assert sustain-
ability initiatives. In the larger lexicon of sustainability practice, this sug-
gests that ‘increasing awareness’, which seems to perennially serve as the 
most palatable aspect of a typical sustainability campaign, would not have 
the same sort of traction here as one might expect elsewhere in the world. 
Because citizens in Qatar and the other Gulf states rarely have the power 
to elect the offi cials who might confi gure social and environmental policy, 
the impact of grassroots organization – or, simply changing citizens’ per-
spectives on the importance of the environment – is structurally de-linked 
from its conceptual fruition in policy and law. Instead, political power in 
the region is strongly top-down: leaders assume the role of confi guring 
appropriate policy for state and citizenry, and citizens generally yield in-
dividual or personal responsibility for social, economic or environmental 
change to that leadership. This top-down approach is evident in the broad 
penchant for master planning, the strikingly opaque and primary driving 
force behind sustainable development in the region (which I will consider 
in more depth in the next section).
While my basic contention, then, is that the social, cultural and political 
context of the contemporary Gulf state meshes poorly with many of the 
central assumptions of sustainable development theory and practice, one 
might also consider the potential advantages of the top-down political 
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structure of Qatar and the other Gulf states in building a more sustainable 
future. Signifi cant policy steps towards sustainability are, in many ways, 
simply one decree away from reality in the contemporary Gulf. Combined 
with the possibilities produced by the astonishing wealth of these states, 
the top-down structure of policy decision making yields a nimbleness 
that might potentially benefi t sustainability, for policy decisions avoid 
the mire of congressional or parliamentary politics typical of Western and 
democratic forms of governance. Furthermore, I would also add that even 
foreigners with a few months of experience in the Gulf states can quickly 
perceive that simply classifying these societies as ‘non-democratic’ does 
little justice to societies in which citizens are, in many senses, quite capable 
of voicing their concerns through indigenous familial and tribal networks. 
While citizens may lack the capacity to elect representative leaders, other 
networks, including tribal and familial associations, social networks and 
professional connections provide ample opportunity for many citizens 
to assert their opinions to policy makers and power holders. These very 
same networks challenge the rigid defi nitions of civil society developed in 
the west and purveyed broadly in the critiques levied against the region. 
So perhaps the better question is this: how can these indigenous forms 
of social relation and consultation come to play an instrumental role in 
building a sustainability drive at the grassroots or community level?
With those important caveats aside, the centralized and top-down na-
ture of political power in the Gulf states has resulted in a highly fi ltered 
rendition of sustainable development. In practice, the models of sustain-
ability promoted and adopted by the state focus heavily on technological 
innovation and infrastructural development. These particular aspects of 
sustainable development mesh seamlessly with the imperative of urban 
development described in the previous section, while simultaneously 
marginalizing the more threatening socio-cultural and political facets of 
the sustainability paradigm.
Master Planning and the Perils of Supermodernism
In practice, the imperative of urban development and the top-down politi-
cal structure of the Gulf state coalesce in urban master planning. As the 
primary avenue by which sustainable development is articulated in the 
contemporary Gulf states, master planning drives urban development 
– an urban development, as I have argued above, that is a socio-politi-
cal necessity in the typical Gulf state. Master planning also confi rms the 
central role of the state and its hereditary leaders in that urban develop-
ment and, therefore, in the extrapolation of urban sustainable develop-
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ment. In addition to reinforcing the top-down structure of political power, 
and in addition to fuelling the transfer of wealth via urban development, 
the discourse of master planning in the Gulf produces an urban form 
that diverges signifi cantly from the models and best practices that have 
accumulated in decades of conversation about urban sustainability and 
sustainable development. More specifi cally, I will argue that the super-
modernism that results from urban master planning in the Gulf city con-
signs sustainability to a spatial discourse antithetical to its meaningful 
implementation.
The modern Gulf home is behind a tall wall. The wall itself delineates 
the property and yields a culturally normative degree of privacy to the 
family that resides behind that wall. The private spaces inside these walls 
are often highly manicured, carefully tended and surprisingly green. This 
managed and manicured private space contrasts sharply with the inter-
stitial land between and beyond these walls. From a vista anywhere in 
the suburbs of Doha, one can observe a strange combination of elements: 
high walls that shield private space from view, towering mansions that 
peer over the walls that surround them and chaotic interstitial space that 
fi lls the space between and beyond these ubiquitous walls. This interstitial 
space is of particular note – piles of construction debris lay abandoned, ad 
hoc dirt lanes become shortcuts between boulevards, sidewalks peter out 
in the hardscrabble desert and garbage blown by the wind accrues against 
the exteriors of these walls (see fi gure 14.1). In passing from these chaotic 
and abandoned interstitial spaces into the private spaces of the family 
property, one crosses the distinct threshold between disorder and order.
This sharp contrast is not consigned to the residential level. Aspire 
Park, for example, is the agglomeration of stadiums, parkland and athletic 
facilities built to host the 2006 Asian Games (see fi gure 14.2). This highly 
managed and modernistic space abuts two large shopping malls. It now 
functions as a public park, and is cared for by a small army of South Asian 
custodians, gardeners and guards. The interior of the park echoes James 
Holston’s description (1989) of Brasilia and James Scott’s (1998) critical 
description of the urban results of high-modern design. Humans struggle 
to make use of the intricately planned spaces and pedestrian boulevards 
that carefully connect the various facilities of the park. They are dwarfed 
by the surroundings, and even when people are about the park feels al-
most empty. In contrast to the centre of this planned space, the periphery 
of the park is chaotic: rickety chain-link fences demarcate the transition to 
unplanned interstitial space. Walking paths simply end in a rocky dirt lot; 
grass fi elds suddenly give way to gravel or sand. Indeed, the threshold 
one encounters upon entering walled private property is replicated at 
this supermodern scale: at the interstices of the massive planned develop-
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ments and trophy projects typical of the Gulf city, the managed and mani-
cured gives way to empty lots, debris, gravel and sand.
The lived experience of dwelling in the modern Gulf city, then, in-
volves movement back and forth across the threshold between modern-
istic planned spaces and the chaos of the interstitial space that surrounds 
them. I suggest this experience is indicative of one of the principle pat-
terns of the Gulf city: the energy, planning and management of the Gulf 
city is directed inwardly at the discrete units of urban space. Surrounding 
these planned and modern spaces is the fi eld they punctuate – an inter-
stitial urban domain seemingly beyond the gaze of urban planners. This 
pattern can be traced across scales in the Gulf city: the threshold observed 
at the level of the individual residence is replicated at the level of the su-
permodern structures that now proliferate in the urban environment of 
the region.
Figure 14.1. Debris outside the wall of a housing compound. Photograph by 
Kristin Giordano.
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The term supermodernism has a long and vibrant pedigree (Ibelings 
1995; Auge 1995). Here, I am interested the portion of that discussion 
which concerns the expanding scope of these planned modern spaces. In 
the Gulf states, rapid urban development and the extraordinary wealth 
fl owing through the region have continually expanded the scale of the 
typical component of urban development. The planning and construction 
of hotels, particular buildings, parks or mosques continues, but increas-
ingly larger spaces are being incorporated into this supermodernist and 
highly planned spatial discourse.12 In part, supermodernism refers to the 
expansive scale of these constructions, a spatial discourse in which whole 
planned communities, discrete ‘cities’, offshore islands and other vast 
planned spaces sprout in and around the city. In Doha, for example, The 
Pearl development, which was briefl y described earlier in this chapter, is 
a resort-like residential and commercial development constructed on a 
Figure 14.2. Aspire Park grounds on the weekend. Photograph by Kristin 
Giordano.
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large human-made island just north of the city. It is intended to be home 
to some 40,000 residents in a combination of private villas and tall apart-
ment buildings. The Pearl includes dozens of restaurants, high-end ho-
tels, a marina, commercial space and, perhaps most problematically, only 
four lanes of road connecting it with the mainland peninsula. Similarly, 
‘Education City’ is a vast complex of American Universities and other 
institutions located in what is for the time being the periphery of urban 
Doha. In Dubai, these supermodern spaces have proliferated for years: 
‘Internet City’ is a free economic zone and information technology park; 
Media City is a tax-free zone intended to attract the media industry active 
in the region; Knowledge Village, International Humanitarian City is an 
independent free zone authority that houses institutions devoted to inter-
nationally-focused humanitarian aid and international development; the 
Masdar Project in Abu Dhabi is a sustainable city (intended to have a zero-
carbon footprint) capable of housing approximately 50,000 people upon 
completion. These are only a handful of the numerous examples that, as 
I have already suggested, are emblematic of the spatial discourse central 
to urban development in the region – a spatial discourse that, following 
others, I refer to as supermodernism (e.g. Ackley 2007).
In other published work, I have envisioned this spatialization of the 
urban form as a strategic plan to compartmentalize foreign matter, to 
segregate that foreign matter, and to thereby assert the predominance of 
indigenous culture and its sovereignty over the vast fl ows of people and 
culture hosted by the Gulf states.13 This explanation echoes the conceptu-
alization of graduated sovereignty as one of the principle tools by which 
Asian states strategically grapple with neoliberal fl ows. Here, however, 
my focus is on the implications of this pattern of urban development for 
the expressed goal of sustainability in the urban centres of the region. 
The supermodern compartmentalization of urban development in Doha, 
Dubai and the other Gulf cities functions as the principal frame for urban 
sustainability: in Masdar City, the region’s fi rst and largest attempt to con-
struct a ‘sustainable’ city, we see the signifi cant capital at hand devoted to 
the sorts of sustainable goals that other cities only dream of, particularly 
through the utilization of a constellation of technologies targeting net-zero 
carbon emissions (Reiche 2009, 2010; Sgouridis and Kennedy 2009). Qatar 
now has its own plans for an ‘Energy City’ that will use the latest green 
technology, rely heavily on solar energy and work carefully to improve air 
and water quality while reducing the waste stream (Reiche 2010). These 
projects interlock with the political economy of urban development, for 
their construction and ongoing maintenance relies upon the foreign la-
bour that transfers wealth from state to citizenry. Supermodern urban 
development also confi rms the top-down structure of political power in 
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the Gulf states – even if the projects are not directly implemented by the 
state, the land grants and permits for developments of this scale require 
intricate connections with the top echelons of the Gulf state. But my con-
cern here is with the product of this system and, more specifi cally, with the 
friction between urban supermodernism and sustainability.
I suggest two essential and interrelated fl aws inherent to the spatial dis-
course evinced by these projects and plans. First, descriptions of Masdar 
City footnote the fact that some 40,000 to 60,000 workers will commute to 
the planned city on a daily basis. Throughout the Gulf, these supermod-
ern projects and monumental spaces are the visible stage presented to the 
cosmopolitan global audience. Behind the stage curtain, however, lie the 
support industries, service facilities and labour camps that house these 
immense labour forces. In Qatar, the South Asian labour force that builds, 
cleans, maintains and serves the various supermodern projects and urban 
spaces in Doha typically resides in the Industrial Area, a gritty and expan-
sive grid of industry and labour camps at the periphery of the city. Similar 
areas exist in most of the Gulf cities, and plans for extensive ‘Bachelor Cit-
ies’ abound in planning circles throughout the Gulf. This offstage activity 
is central to the day-to-day operation of the Gulf city. It belies the discrete 
and compartmentalized presentation of these supermodern spaces, and in 
this case, challenges the logic of Masdar’s calculation of its sustainability 
– how can a discrete and bounded ‘sustainable city’ account for the impact 
of the vast labour force that traverses the backstage/frontstage divide 
every workday?
Second, the compartmentalization of sustainability to a master-planned 
development essentially consigns sustainability initiatives to the status 
shared by the constellation of other principles, ideas and whims guiding 
the spatial articulation of the Gulf city. In other words, a ‘sustainable city’ 
located on the periphery of Abu Dhabi frames sustainability as a thematic 
attraction – a symbolic commodity scavenged from environmental and 
urban discourses to exemplify the modernity of the nation (see Hubbert 
2009). In this spatial discourse, sustainability is therefore on par with the 
industry of ‘Industry City’ in Dubai, with education in Doha’s ‘Education 
City’ or with the opulent Venetian conception of The Pearl offshore resi-
dential community in Qatar. Moreover, the spatial compartmentalization 
of sustainability to one of many master-planned supermodern Gulf spaces 
corresponds with the ideological compartmentalization of sustainability 
as both distinct and equivalent to the constellation of other objectives of 
the contemporary nation-state.14 While the master-planning frame pre-
serves the political economy of urban development and the centraliza-
tion of power in the state and its leadership, it contrasts with the central 
contentions of the meaningful rendition of sustainability sketched at the 
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outset of this chapter: forging a sustainable future requires comprehensive 
action in all facets of urban existence. There can be no compartmentalized 
solutions.
The contemporary Gulf city suggests that, as humans, we are capable 
of working together to construct and perhaps maintain these discrete and 
highly managed places – a skyscraper, a shopping mall, a home, a park, 
even a vast master-planned residential community. But a short trip around 
Doha or any of the other Gulf cities also suggests the diffi culty of linking 
these discrete, managed spaces together into a functional and potentially 
sustainable whole. This observation leaves me with questions. Can a sus-
tainable urban environment really be master planned? Can we connect 
all the complex pieces and parts that comprise a planned city? Or is the 
managed and manicured perfection of modernism and its master plans an 
elusive goal? Will these chaotic interstitial spaces always exist? And will 
the cities of the Gulf always need a dirty backstage, like the bachelor cities 
now being constructed around the Gulf, or Doha’s industrial area, where 
I spend my weekends interviewing migrant labourers who live in a Doha 
that most middle class residents never see?
Conclusion
In her introductory comments to a recent conference, Qatar University’s 
president, Dr. Sheikha Abdulla Al-Misnad, expressed an interest in how 
sustainability might serve as a counterbalance to the sense of entitlement 
and, more broadly, the rampant consumerism that has taken hold amongst 
the citizens of the khaleeji states.15 Three decades ago, Sulayman Khalaf de-
scribed something quite similar to the problem identifi ed by the universi-
ty’s president – a broad set of cultural conditions that manifest themselves 
in the individual as what he describes as ‘the notion of unlimited good’ 
(1992). In my own conversations with Qatari citizens, the extraordinary 
level of consumption typical of the Gulf citizen is often juxtaposed with 
the impoverished past from which many citizens’ parents and grand-
parents emerged. Petroleum wealth, often conceived as a blessing from 
Allah in reward for the penurious past, has provided them with an era of 
plentitude. At the current juncture, that consumer culture is the focus of 
much conversation but very little scholarship in the Gulf states. In a sense, 
these broader cultural issues lurk behind the more focused analysis I have 
provided here, and certainly merit more sustained attention.
In my analysis I have attempted to delineate three arenas of potential 
diffi culty for the implementation of a substantial and meaningful sustain-
ability. To recapitulate, I fi rst suggest that urban development has become 
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an integral conduit for the transfer of state-controlled wealth to its citi-
zenry, and that interrupting urban development in the interests of long-
term sustainability will potentially disturb the legitimacy constructed by 
the political leaders in the GCC states. Second, I contend that the socio-
political organization of the GCC states poorly matches the fundamentally 
democratic assumptions under-girding both theory and praxis in sustain-
ability. Finally, I question whether a meaningful and transformative form 
of sustainable development can truly be master planned for the urban 
environment. As I suggest, the predominant spatial discourse of urban de-
velopment in the region produces highly organized and managed spaces, 
but also seems to produce interstitial and backstage spaces of a strikingly 
different character. None of the conditions described here are consigned 
to the Gulf alone, and it’s certainly true that the implementation of the 
meaningful, substantial and transformative sustainability I chart at the 
outset of this chapter would face signifi cant, if not insurmountable, chal-
lenges in a variety of socio-cultural settings. With signifi cant reservoirs of 
capital at hand, however, the Gulf States seek to move rapidly towards 
these expressed goals. This chapter seeks to chart several signifi cant 
problems that have yet to enter the public discourse about sustainability 
in the region.
Notes
This chapter was originally presented as ‘Doha and Sustainability: An Overview 
of Urban Sustainability and Four Questions’ for the second International Social 
Sciences Symposium: Sustainable Development: Issues and Challenges, Qatar 
University, 4 November 2009.
1. See von Sivers (1980) for a longer discussion of Ibn Khaldun’s conception of 
the city.
2. Adams (2001) constructs his analysis of the fl orescence of sustainable develop-
ment thinking around what he calls the mainstream and the counter-current 
defi nitions. Baker provides a more complex categorization, including ideal-
ists, proponents of a strong version of sustainable development, proponents 
of a weak version of sustainable development, and proponents of an approach 
consigned to controlling pollution (Baker 2006: 30–31).
 3. Two of many published examples include (Qatar 2006a, 2006b).
 4. This is not to suggest the same critique does not apply to most cities of the 
world.
 5. These coastal towns were important nodes of social and cultural heterogene-
ity in the region. The entirety of the region also shares a history in the ambit of 
British imperialism, largely administered via British India. All of the states are 
deeply Islamic and, with the exception of Oman, Sunni, although a signifi cant 
Shi’a population resides in western Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain.
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6. Reiche (2009: 379) briefl y makes this point in his discussion of the impetus 
behind Abu Dhabi’s construction of Masdar City.
 7. Nagy (2006) details the proliferation of the villa in Qatar as a force of social 
change.
 8. While the line between the public and private sector is diffi cult to clearly de-
lineate in the Gulf states, a variety of sources point to the ongoing centrality 
of the government in supporting industries and apportioning jobs to citizens 
(Qatar 2007: 26; Berrebi, Martorell and Tanner 2009; Willoughby 2008; Niblock 
2007).
 9. Although the proliferation of these spaces led Basar (2007: 103) to note a ‘free-
hold revolution’ in the extrapolation of Dubai’s urban model.
10. Indeed, one suspects that the plans for a tourist-based economy have mis-
apprehended the fl ow of skilled foreign labour employed in the region as 
evidence of an economically substantial population interested in recreational 
travel to the Gulf states.
11. It is also of note that as a result of this arrangement both state and citizen have 
confi gured and idealized roles as stewards of the development process.
12. See Nagy (2000) for a portrait of master planning in Doha a decade ago.
13. See Gardner 2010, 2009, 2008.
14. It should be noted that Masdar was conceived as an innovative supermodern 
space from which sustainable ideas and practices would eventually fl ow to 
Emirati society at large, a process Reiche (2010: 2) refers to as ‘policy transfer’.
15. Dr. Sheikha al-Misnad, keynote address, the Second International Social Sci-
ences Symposium, Qatar University, 5 November 2009.
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